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  “...little research to date has generated deep understand of the relationship between
organizations and the digital economy ...”.
Orlikowski and Iacono (2000: 365)
1 Introduction
John Kay makes the point that “[i]t is a clich´ e that we live today in a knowledge economy” (Kay
2005: 266).1 In recent years it has become common for politicians and commentators to argue
that changes in technology, in particular information and communication technology (ICT), have
become the major driver of economic growth. The then Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology, Neal Lane, said in April 1999 that
“[t]he digital economy−deﬁned by the changing characteristics of information, com-
puting, and communications−is now the preeminent driver of economic growth and
social change.” (Quoted in Brynjolfsson and Kahin 2000: 1).
Many commentators argue that the eﬀects of ICTs are so pervasive through out the economy
that we are now in a “new economy”. Alcaly (2003: 4), for example, argues that
“...much is new about this new economy, particularly its signature information tech-
nology, the broad combination of technical equipment and know-now that enables us
to process, store, and transmit information more eﬃciently. There have also been
signiﬁcant changes in the ways businesses operate, in the extent of trade and eco-
nomic integration among nation−globalization−an in the inﬂuence and inventiveness
of ﬁnancial markets, including the stock and junk-bond markets.”
For Alcaly the new economy developed in response to pressures from the application of infor-
mation technologies in conjunction with increased global competition, deregulation and ﬁnancial
innovation. These factors have altered the whole business environment. Coyle (2001: 230) notes
that,
“[t]echnology means the boundaries between what used to be diﬀerent markets are
more ﬂuid, so your new competitor might be from a business you used to think of as
entirely diﬀerent from yours.”
Change is aﬀecting not just markets but also ﬁrms within those markets. Rajan and Zingales
(2003: 80) argue,
1Sometimes also called the information economy or the digital economy or the weightless economy
1“[i]ncreased competition, changes in technology, and widespread access to ﬁnance have
reduced the advantages of the large, vertically integrated ﬁrm. We should therefore
expect the largest ﬁrms to have shrunk. This is indeed the case.”
They go on to point out that these same factors have also aﬀected the relationship between
physical and human capital in ﬁrms creation of value and this is changing the organisational
structure of the ﬁrm.
“Human capital is replacing inanimate assets as the most important source of corpo-
rate capabilities and value. In both their organizational structure and their promotion
and compensation policies, large ﬁrms are becoming more like professional partner-
ships.” (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 90)
Further, Rajan and Zingales (2003: 87) argue that we are in fact seeing a new “kinder, gentler
ﬁrm”. This is in response to the changing balance of power within ﬁrms following on from the
increasing importance of the worker. In Rajan and Zingales’s view
“[t]he single biggest challenge for the owners or top management today is to manage
in an atmosphere of diminished authority. Authority has to be gained by persuading
lower managers and workers that the workplace is an attractive one and one that they
would hate to lose. To do this, top management has to ensure that work is enriching,
that responsibilities are handed down, and rich bonds develop among workers and
between themselves and workers” (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 87).
That ﬁrms are changing matters because ﬁrms are the institutional structure within which
most economic activity takes place and so as they change much of our economic lives change.
Herbert Simon (1991: 27) makes this point about the importance of ﬁrms by asking us to envision
a mythical visitor from Mars. This visitor approaches Earth from space equipped with a telescope
which reveals social structures. What our visitor’s telescope would display is, according to Simon,
that ﬁrms are the “dominant feature of the landscape”. For Simon the view that our visitor would
get of the developed world or parts of the old Soviet Union or areas of urban China or urban
India is one where most of the economic activity takes place, not within markets or self-suﬃcient
households, but within the framework of ﬁrms. Roberts (2004: 77-8) explains that
“[i]n fact, John McMillan (2002: 168-9) estimates that less than a third of all the
transactions in the U.S. economy occur through markets, and instead over 70 percent
are within ﬁrms.”
2But despite the obvious empirical importance of the ﬁrm, when our visitor turns its attention to
an overview of the theory that purports to explain this “dominant feature of the landscape”, its
survey would reveal a somewhat peculiar looking theoretical terrain. As Oliver Hart has written
“An outsider to the ﬁeld of economics would probably take it for granted that economists
have a highly developed theory of the ﬁrm. After all, ﬁrms are the engines of growth
of modern capitalistic economies, and so economists must surely have fairly sophis-
ticated views of how they behave. In fact, little could be further from the truth.
Most formal models of the ﬁrm are extremely rudimentary, capable only of portray-
ing hypothetical ﬁrms that bear little relation to the complex organizations we see
in the world. Furthermore, theories that attempt to incorporate real world features
of corporations, partnerships and the like often lack precision and rigor, and have
therefore failed, by and large, to be accepted by the theoretical mainstream.” (Hart
1989: 1757).
While Hart’s point is made with reference to the orthodox view of theory of the (physical
capital based) ﬁrm it applies with even greater vengeance when we consider the (human capital
based) ﬁrm relevant to the knowledge or information economy. None of the textbook (neoclassi-
cal) model or the transaction cost model or the incentive-system approach or the Grossman Hart
Moore (GHM) approach to the ﬁrm are able to fully capture the changes to the ﬁrm that the
movement towards a knowledge economy entails. As knowledge becomes more important in the
economy so human capital becomes more important to the ﬁrm and physical capital relatively
less so. The major asset of a knowledge ﬁrm is their workers’ human capital. Crucially this
increases the worker’s importance and thus improves their outside options and therefore changes
the power relationships within the ﬁrm. Firm’s organisational structures are changing to reﬂect
this new reality. On the other hand the orthodox theories of the ﬁrm are, in the main, silent
about the changes that this increase in the importance of human capital is bringing about. This
essay will examine these theories in an attempt to delineate the reasons for this silence.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. The mainstream approaches to the ﬁrm, and their
shortcomings with regard to the human capital based ﬁrm, are analysed in sections 2 to 5. Section
2 will discuss the neoclassical model, section 3 covers the transaction cost approach, section 4
looks at the incentive-system theory while section 5 considers the Grossman Hart Moore model
along with two extensions to the GHM approach. Section 6 looks at the eﬀects that the division
of knowledge has on the location of production and section 7 is the conclusion.
32 The neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm
The model of the “ﬁrm” found in most microeconomic textbooks does not incorporate knowledge
− individual or institutional − or the knowledge worker; it can’t since it isn’t a “theory of the
ﬁrm” in any meaningful sense. The output side of the standard neoclassical model is a theory of
supply rather than a true theory of the ﬁrm. Many would date the beginning of a serious theory
of the ﬁrm as recently as Knight (1921) or Coase (1937), rather than to the earlier neoclassical
revolution.2 Before the contributions of Knight and Coase, we had discussions of pin factories, but
the discussion was about the importance of the division of labour rather than being an ‘enquiry
into the nature and causes of the ﬁrm’. As has been pointed out by Demsetz (1982, 1988 and
1995) before Knight and Coase − and it could be added for much of the period after them −
the fundamental preoccupation of economists was with the (knowledgeless) price system and
hence little, or no, attention was paid to either the ﬁrm or the consumer as separate, important,
economic entities. Firms (and consumers) existed as handmaidens to the price system.
The interest in the price system, culminating in the “perfect competition” model, has its
intellectual origins in the eighteenth-century debate between free traders and mercantilists. This
debate was, to a large degree, about the proper scope of government in the economy and the
model it gave rise to reﬂects this. The central question of the debate was, Is central planning
necessary to avoid the problems of a chaotic economic system? Adam Smith famously answered
“no”.3 Smith
“...realised that social harmony would emerge naturally as human beings struggled to
ﬁnd ways to live and work with each other. Freedom and self-interest need not lead to
chaos, but − as if guided by an ‘invisible hand’ − would produce order and concord.
2O’Brien (1984: 25) takes a contrary position: “[s]erious discussion of the history of the theory of the ﬁrm has
to start with Alfred Marshall.” O’Brien’s argument is based, in the main, on Marshall (1920). O’Brien also argues
that developments subsequent to Marshall have resulted in many of Marshall’s insights being lost to succeeding
generations of economists. We would therefore argue that Marshall has left little in the way of a legacy in terms
of the mainstream theory of the ﬁrm. In addition to his views on Marshall’s work and later developments O’Brien
also argues that any “attempt to construct a pre-Marshallian theory from the materials available is likely to be
unsuccessful.” See, however, Williams (1978) for such an attempt. On the neglect of Marshall’s ‘Industry and
Trade’ (Marshall 1920) see also Liebhafsky (1955). The development of the “theory of the ﬁrm” from Marshall to
Robinson and Chamberlin is also dealt with in Moss (1984).
3According to Smith the government has three duties: “[t]he ﬁrst duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the
society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies ...”. Smith (1776: Book V, Chapter 1, Part
First, page 689). “The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the
society from injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration
of justice, ...”. Smith (1776: Book V, Chapter 1, Part II, page 709). “The third and last duty of the sovereign
or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which,
though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature that
the proﬁt could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore
cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain” Smith (1776:
Book V, Chapter 1, Part III, page 723). For a fuller discussion of Smith’s view on the role of government see
Kennedy (2005).
4They would also bring about the most eﬃcient possible use of resources. As free
people struck bargains with others − solely in order to better their own condition −
the nation’s land, capital, skills, knowledge, time, enterprise and inventiveness would
be drawn automatically and inevitably to the ends and purposes that people valued
most highly. Thus the maintenance of a prospering social order did not require the
continued supervision of kings and ministers. It would grow organically as a product
of human nature” (Butler 2007: 27-8).
For Smith, markets are the most prominent mechanism for solving the problems of coordination
and motivation that arise with interdependencies of specialisation and the division of labour.
Market institutions leave individuals free to pursue self-interested behaviour, but guide their
choices by the prices they pay and receive. The following 200 hundred years amounted to a closer
examination of what conditions would be suﬃcient for the price system to avoid chaos.
The formal model that arose from this examination is one which abstracts completely from any
form of centralised control in the economy. It is a model delineated by “perfect decentralisation”.
Authority, be it in the form of a government or a ﬁrm or a household, plays no role in coordinating
resources. The only parameters guiding decision making are those given within the model − tastes
and technologies − and those determined impersonally on markets − prices. All parameters
are outside the control of any of the economic agents and this eﬀectively deprives all forms of
authority a role in allocation. This includes, of course, the ﬁrm. It doesn’t matter whether it is
general equilibrium, characterised by Walras’s auctioneer, or partial equilibrium, characterised
by Marshall’s representative ﬁrm, there is no serious consideration given to the ﬁrm as a problem
solving institution.
In neoclassical theory, the ﬁrm is a ‘black box’ there to explain how changes in inputs lead
to changes in outputs. The ﬁrm is a conceptualisation that represents, formally, the actions
of the owners of inputs who place their inputs in the highest value uses, and makes sure that
production is separated from consumption. The ﬁrm produces only for outsiders, there is no on-
the-job or internal consumption, no self-suﬃciency. In fact there are no managers or employees
to indulge in on the job consumption and as production is separated from consumption, no self-
suﬃciency. Production for outsiders is, according to Demsetz (1995), the deﬁnition of a ﬁrm in
the neoclassical model:
“[w]hat is needed is a concept of the ﬁrm in which production is exclusively for sale
to those formally outside the ﬁrm. This requirement deﬁnes the ﬁrm (for neoclassical
5theory), but it has little to do with the management of some by others. The ﬁrm in
neoclassical theory is no more or less than a specialized unit of production, but it can
be a one-person unit” (Demsetz 1995: 9).
As inputs are combined in the optimal fashion by the actions of independent owners of inputs
motivated solely by market prices, there is no need for ‘management of some by others’, there is
no role for managers or employees. Also note that as competition assures the absence of proﬁts
and losses in equilibrium, there is no need to have a residual claimant. This means that, in one
sense at least, there are no owners of the ﬁrm.4 As there are no physical assets controlled by the
ﬁrm, there are no (residual) control rights over these assets to allocate. This implies there are no
owners of the ﬁrm in the Grossman Hart Moore sense (see section 5).
The neoclassical production function is a way of representing the (eﬃcient) black box con-
version of inputs into outputs but tells us little about the inner workings of the black box. The
production function is independent of the institutional framework of output creation. It can be
given two interpretations: it can represent the production method of a single ﬁrm, of which all
known ﬁrms are just divisions or, equally, it could represent the outcome of a series of purely
market based transactions which give rise to the observed outputs.5 Thus it represents the ‘ﬁrm’
without explaining the ‘ﬁrm’. The boundaries of the ﬁrm is an issue described by Williamson
(1993: 4) as one of
“...make-or-buy. What is it that determines which transactions are executed how?
That posed a deep puzzle for which the ﬁrm-as-production function approach had
little to contribute.”
Hart (1995: 17) criticises the neoclassical model based on three characteristics of the theory.
First, he notes that the theory completely ignores incentive problems within the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm
is a perfectly eﬃcient ‘black box’. Second, the theory has nothing to say about the internal
organisation of the ﬁrm. Nothing is said about the hierarchical structure, how decisions are
made, who has authority within a ﬁrm. Third, the theory tells us nothing about how to pin
down the boundaries of the ﬁrm. The theory is as much a theory of plant or division size as ﬁrm
size. As Hart points out
4Hansmann (1996), for example, states “[a] ﬁrm’s “owners,” as the term is conventionally used and as it will be
used here, are those persons who share two formal rights: the right to control the ﬁrm and the right to appropriate
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, or residual earnings (that is, the net earnings that remain with the ﬁrm after it has made all
payments to which it is contractually committed, such as wages, interest payments, and prices for supplies).” (page
11) He later adds “[n]ot all ﬁrms have owners. In nonproﬁt ﬁrms, in particular, the persons who have control are
barred from receiving residual earnings.” (page 12)
5This second interpretation is more inline with the Demsetz argument.
6“[t]o put it in stark terms ...neoclassical theory is consistent with there being one
huge ﬁrm in the world, with every existing ﬁrm ...being a division of this ﬁrm. It is
also consistent with every plant and division of an existing ﬁrm becoming a separate
and independent ﬁrm” (Hart 1995: 17).
Cyert and Hedrick (1972) addressed similar points. They argue that in the neoclassical system
the ﬁrm doesn’t exist, that no real world problems of ﬁrms are considered, that there are no
organisational problems or any internal decision-making process at all.
“In one sense the controversy over the theory of the ﬁrm has arisen over a non-existent
entity. The crux of microeconomics is the competitive system. Within the competi-
tive model there is a hypothetical construct called the ﬁrm. This construct consists
of a single decision criterion and an ability to get information from an external world,
called the “market” [8, Cyert and March, 1963, pp. 4-16]. The information received
from the market enables the ﬁrm to apply its decision criterion, and the competitive
system then proceeds to allocate resources and produce output. The market informa-
tion determines the behavior of the so called ﬁrm. None of the problems of real ﬁrms
can ﬁnd a home within this special construct. There are no organizational problems
nor is there any room for analysis of the internal decision-making process” (Cyert and
Hedrick 1972: 398).
Thus within the neoclassical model of the price system, the ﬁrm’s only role is to allow input
owners to convert inputs into outputs in response to market prices. Firms have no internal
organisation since they have no need of one, they have no owners since there is nothing to
own. Questions about the existence, deﬁnition and boundaries of the ﬁrm are to a large degree
meaningless within this framework since ﬁrms, by any meaningful deﬁnition of that term, don’t
really exist. As Foss, Lando and Thomsen (1998) summarise it:
“The pure analysis of the market institution leaves almost no room for the ﬁrm (De-
breu 1959). Under the assumption of a perfect set of contingent markets, as well
as certain other restrictive assumptions, the model describes how markets may pro-
duce eﬃcient outcomes. The question how organizations should be structured does
not arise, because market-contracting perfectly solves all incentive and coordination
issues. By assumption, ﬁrm behaviour (proﬁt maximization) is invariant to institu-
tional form (e.g. ownership structure). The whole economy can operate eﬃciently as
one great system of markets, in which autonomous agents enter into very elaborate
7contracts with each other. However, by treating the ﬁrm itself as a black box, where
internal structure, contracts, etc. disappear from the picture, there are many other
issues that the theory cannot address. For example, the theory does not tell us why
ﬁrms exist” (Foss, Lando and Thomsen 1998: 1-2).
Given there is no serious modelling of the ﬁrm, there is no way to deal with the knowledge
ﬁrm within this framework. There are no organisational problems or any internal decision-making
process, in fact, there is no organisational structure at all and thus the advent of the knowledge
economy can not alter this nonexistent structure. As there is no role for managers or employees
there can be no knowledge workers in the ﬁrm. But the growth in knowledge workers is one of
the most important aspects in the development of the knowledge society. And their advent will
change the way we think about ﬁrms.
3 The transaction cost approach
The recognition that writing a contract is in and of itself costly lies at the heart of the large and
growingliterature on the transaction cost approach to the ﬁrm. This literature has been developed
by, among others, Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978). Coase
(1937) started the transaction cost approach by making a simple, but important point, there are
costs to carrying out market transactions. Costs, which today, are called transaction costs,
“[w]hat the prices are have to be discovered. There are negotiations to be undertaken,
contracts have to be drawn up, inspections have to be made, arrangements have to
be made to settle disputes, and so on.” (Coase 1992: 715).
Roberts (2004: 90) deﬁnes transaction costs as
“...the costs of ﬁnding and qualifying trading partners, of establishing speciﬁcations
and prices, of negotiating and drafting contracts, and of monitoring and enforcing
agreements. They are also the opportunity costs of lost beneﬁts that are occasioned
by the diﬃculties of developing complete, enforceable agreements between separate
parties.”
Transaction cost economics is based the ideas of bounded rationality − intendedly rational,
but only limitedly so − and opportunism − self-interest with guile. Two consequences of these
assumptions is that contracts will be incomplete and contracts may not be honoured. Hart (1995:
823) argues that in transaction cost economics contracts are incomplete for three reasons, all of
which are, in his view, forms of bounded rationality.
“First, in a complex and highly unpredictable world, it is hard for people to think very
far ahead and to plan for all the various contingencies that may arise. Second, even if
individual plans can be made, it is hard for the contracting parties to negotiate about
these plans, not least because they have to ﬁnd a common language to describe states
of the world and actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much
of a guide. Third, even if the parties can plan and negotiate about the future, it may
be very diﬃcult for them to write their plans down in such a way that, in the event
of a dispute, an outside authority − a court, say − can ﬁgure out what these plans
mean and enforce them. In other words, the parties must be able to communicate not
only with each other, but also with outsiders who may have little knowledge about
the environment in which the contracting parties operate.”
But why do incomplete contracts matter? If parties to a contract can renegotiate the contract,
and thus ﬁll in any gaps, why does contractual incompleteness matter? First, there may be
costs to haggling over the terms and conditions of the new contract. Haggling over the division
of surpluses is ineﬃcient in that it is time-consuming and wastes resources while serving no
productive purpose. Second, informational asymmetries may prevent the parties from reaching
an eﬃcient outcome. Assume the buyer of an input does not know the actual cost of the input but
only knows the probability distribution from which the costs are drawn. The seller of the input
knows the true cost. Supply of the input can be ensured by a high price oﬀer from the buyer. If
the buyer wants to cover the seller’s costs with probability one then this could be an expensive
option as the buyer will be overpaying in the low cost states of the world. If a low price oﬀer is
made then the seller will not supply in the high cost states of the world and so proﬁt maximising
behaviour by the buyer may lead to proﬁtable trades not taking place.6 An important point here
is that if switching to a new trading partner at the renegotiation stage was easy then neither of
these two costs would be signiﬁcant. Thus for these costs to be high there must be something
preventing the switching to a new trading partner. That ‘something’ is normally taken to be ex
ante relationship-speciﬁc investment. In other words, a prior investment whose value is greatest
6Assume the buyer values the input at 1. The seller’s costs are 1
2 or 1, each with probability 1
2. An oﬀer by the
buyer of 1 ensures supply in all states of the world but results in zero proﬁts for the buyer. An oﬀer of 1
2 results
in non-supply in the high cost states of the world but proﬁts of 1 − 1
2 = 1
2 in the low cost states of the world.
Thus the low price, trade only 1
2 the time oﬀer is more proﬁtable than the high price, trade at all times oﬀer and
therefore proﬁtable trades don’t take place.
9when the contracting parties relationship extends over time but for which little or no value is
created if the parties relationship breaks down. Such investments are normally thought of as
investment in physical capital but as Roberts (2004: 91) points out,
“[f]irm-speciﬁc human capital−knowledge that is only (or especially) valuable in the
context of employment with a particular ﬁrm−is another example.”
Relationship-speciﬁc investments result in there being a third cost of incomplete contracts. It may
be that because contracts are incomplete parties are deterred from making eﬃcient relationship-
speciﬁc investments. In a comprehensive contracts world, relationship-speciﬁc investments could
be protected by enforceable contracts. In an incomplete contracts world this may not be possible.
Parties will recognise that any long-term contract between them will be incomplete. This could be
because of problems such as being unable to specify far in advance the quality and quantity of the
goods traded. This incompleteness will mean the contract will be subject to renegotiation. Even
in a situation where problems of haggling and asymmetric information don’t arise the gains from
trade will have to be divided and this division will depend on the ex post bargaining strengths
of the parties rather than on what is written in the contract or on the grounds of economic
eﬃciency. This raises the fear that one party could be exploited by another. For example, a
input supplier, who has made (sunk) relationship speciﬁc investments, may worry that the buyer
will take advantage of these investments to drive the price he pays for the input down to around
variable cost, so there is little or no contribution to covering the investment costs. But it is still
not worthwhile for the supplier to stop supplying the buyer. This is simply because the sunk
investment costs have to be paid whether or not supply takes place, and the asset has no other
proﬁtable use. This exploitation of quasi-rent − returns greater than what is required to keep
asset in its current use once it has been created − is the classic “hold-up” problem.
Realising that such exploitation could occur may could result in the supplier being unwilling
to undertake the investment in the ﬁrst place. Thus the buyer, if he wants the input supplied
at all, may have to produce it himself. The buyer could purchase the supplier, i.e. vertically
integrate with the supplier, thereby making the supplier part of the buyers ﬁrm. This eliminates
the hold-up problem since the quasi-rents now accrue to the buyer. Use of the investment asset
in now directly under the control of the buyer and all costs of and beneﬁts from investment have
been internalised. The investment decision is now just part of the buyers proﬁt maximisation
problem.
10This argument that vertical integration deals with the hold-up problem is strongest when the
assets involved are physical. The argument is less applicable to relationship-speciﬁc investments
in human capital. As human capital can not be owned, by anyone other the particular individual
acquiring it, the potential for opportunistic behaviour still exists even after vertical integration.
The buyer does not have control over the human capital in the way he does over the physical
capital. The individual who invests in the relationship-speciﬁc human capital still controls that
capital even after becoming part of the buyer’s ﬁrm and thus they can still hold-up the buyer.
Thus the explanation for the existence of ﬁrms as the answer to hold-up problems, related to
relationship-speciﬁc investments, doesn’t hold for the case of a human capital only ﬁrm.
4 The incentive-system theory
This approach to the theory of the ﬁrm was developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994);
Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) and Holmstrom (1999) and has been described by Gibbons (2005:
206) as an “accidental theory of the ﬁrm”. The reason for Gibbons description is that focus
of these papers was not on the make-or-buy problem of the transaction cost or Grossman Hart
Moore approaches but rather on a multi-task, multi-instrument principal-agent problem and its
application to the ﬁrm was an “accidental” outcome of this endeavour.
To analyse the application of this theory to the knowledge ﬁrm we will take advantage of
Gibbons (2005: 210-2) “stick-ﬁgure rendition” of the theory. In the simple Gibbons model there is
a technology of production which is a linear combination of the Agent’s actions: y = f1a1+f2a2+ε
where the ais are actions chosen by the Agent and ε is a noise term. Evaluation of performance
by the Agent is based upon the indicator p which is a diﬀerent linear combination of the Agent’s
actions: p = g1a1 +g2a2 +φ, where φ is another noise term. Gibbons assumes that both parties
are risk-neutral, ω is the total compensation paid by the Principal to the Agent and c(a1,a2)










In addition Gibbons assumes that the Principal and the Agent sign a linear contract, ω = s+bp,
based upon the performance indicator p.
To provide a theory of the ﬁrm this model has to be extended to include physical capital, a
machine, which is used by the Agent during the production of y. Post production this capital
11has a value determined by a third linear combination of the Agent’s actions: v = h1a1 +h2a2 +ξ
where ξ is a third noise term. The choice variables in the model are therefore the Agent’s actions
ai,i = 1,2 and b the slope of the optimal contract. As a point of comparison note that the
ﬁrst-best actions of the Agent are those which maximise the expected total surplus, that is, they
will maximise the expected value of the sum of the Principal’s payoﬀ, y − ω, the Agent’s payoﬀ,
ω − c(a1,a2) and the value of the physical asset, v.
TS
FB = E(y − ω + ω − c(a1,a2) + v)
= E(y + v) − c(a1,a2)
= E(f1a1 + f2a2 + ε + h1a1 + h2a2 + ξ) − c(a1,a2)
= f1a1 + f2a2 + h1a1 + h2a2 − c(a1,a2) assuming E(ε) = E(ξ) = 0










1 = f1 + h1 and aFB
2 = f2 + h2.7 TSFB is independent of the value of b.
If the Principal owns the machine then the Agent is an employee of his ﬁrm and the Principal’s
payoﬀ is y + v − ω, while the Agent’s payoﬀ is ω − c. In this case the Agent’s optimal actions
maximise




























2 assuming E(φ) = 0.
The optimal actions are therefore, a⋆
1E(b) = bg1 and a⋆
2E(b) = bg2.8 The eﬃcient contract slope,
b⋆
E, maximises the expected total surplus, E(y + v) − C(a1,a2) or
TSE(b) = (f1 + h1)a⋆














⇒ fi + hi − ai = 0
⇒ aFB





⇒ bgi − ai = 0
⇒ a⋆
i (b) = bgi
12Alternatively the machine can be owned by the Agent. Gibbons interprets this case as the
Agent being an independent contractor. In this situation the payoﬀs for the Principal will be
y −w and for the Agent they are w +v −c. The optimal actions for the Agent will therefore be,
a⋆
1C(b) = g1b+h1 and a⋆
2C(b) = g2b+h2.9 For this case the eﬃcient slope, b⋆
C, will maximise the
expected total surplus of
TSC(b) = (f1 + h1)a⋆










Gibbons (2005: 211) summaries the analysis so far as
“...having the Agent own the asset causes the Agent to respond to a given contract
slope (b) diﬀerently than when the Agent does not own the asset [i.e. a⋆
iE(b)  = a⋆
iC(b)],
so the make-or-buy problem amounts to determining which of the Agent’s best-
response functions − that of the employee, (a⋆
1E(b),a⋆
2E(b)), or that of the independent
contractor, (a⋆
1C(b),a⋆
2C(b)) − allows the parties to achieve greater total surplus.”
The discussion so far has relied on an unspeciﬁed assumption. This being that the value of
the asset is not contractible and therefore the owner of the asset receives its value. Since the
asset’s value is not contractible putting ownership in the hands of the Agent provides him with
incentives that cannot be replicated via a contract. But providing the Agent with the incentive
to increase the value of the asset may or may not help the Principal control the Agent’s incentives
via contract. That is, if the Agent owns the asset he has two sources of incentives, the asset’s
post-production value and contracted for performance. Without ownership he concentrates solely
on the contracted for performance. Integration would be eﬃcient, that is, having the Principal
own the asset is eﬃcient, when having the Agent do so hurts the Principal’s eﬀorts to create
incentives via contract.
When we turn to consider the case where the additional capital in the model isn’t a machine
but is human capital, as would be important in a knowledge ﬁrm, an important diﬀerence arises.
Critically, ownership can no longer be transferred, as it can in the physical capital case. If the
asset is a human capital asset then, without slavery, ownership can not be transferred, it must
remain with the person who made the investment in the ﬁrst place. Also, as above, the non
contractible of the asset’s value means the Principal and the Agent can not transfer the value
9

















2 assuming E(φ) = E(ξ) = 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions are therefore of the form, bgi + hi − ai = 0 which gives a⋆
iC(b) = gib + hi, i = 1,2.
13of the asset as part of a contract. So in contrast to the physical asset case, with a human
asset, neither ownership nor value can be transferred. Thus if the Agent (Principal) makes an
investment the value of the investment stays with the Agent (Principal) not matter what the
form of the relationship between the Principal and the Agent. Importantly asset ownership can
no longer determine whether the Agent is an employee or a contractor. Therefore a human asset
can not serve as an instrument in the incentive problem in the same way as a physical asset. This
means that the incentive-system theory (in the telling above) can not act as a model of a human
capital based ﬁrm.
5 The Grossman Hart Moore approach
A more recent theory of the ﬁrm is based on the work of Grossman and Hart, (1986, 1987)
and Hart and Moore (1990).10 Within the GHM approach ownership is deﬁned in terms of
residual control over non-human assets, things such as machinery, inventories, buildings, patents,
client lists, ﬁrm’s reputation etc. Owner−managers employ labour that cannot work without the
physical capital these ﬁrms own. Dismissal\resignation of the labour requires them to ﬁnd other
physical capital owning organisations (ﬁrms) to employ them. On liquidation of the ﬁrm, physical
capital can be sold and the proceeds disbursed to the owners (shareholders). The standard theory
of the ﬁrm is based on the role of non-human capital in the ﬁrm. The deﬁnition of a ﬁrm, the
determinants of the boundaries of a ﬁrm − that is, the determinants of vertical integration of
ﬁrms, the meaning of ownership of the ﬁrm, the nature of authority within the ﬁrm are all
functions of control rights over the ﬁrm’s non-human assets. Making non-human assets the
centre of the theory means that questions to do with the ownership and control of the physical
information technology can be addressed but this concentration on non-human assets means
that the theory doesn’t deal with ﬁrms based on human assets. However it had noted from the
beginning that the theory could be extended to include human capital. As Hart (1988: 151)
argues:
“...one diﬀerence with previous work is the emphasis on how integration changes
control over physical assets. This is in contrast to Coase’s 1937 paper which focuses
on the way integration changes an ordinary contractual relationship into one where
an employee accepts the authority of an employer (within limits). Note that these
10Introductions to this literature, of varying technical sophistication, can be found in Hart (1988, 1989, 1995)
and Moore (1992).
14approaches are not contradictory. Authority and residual rights of control are very
close and there is no reason why our analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of allocating
residual rights of control could not be extended to cover human, as well as physical,
assets.”
But this extension isn’t entirely satisfactory.
Once we move to a situation where ﬁrms may own\need little physical capital, then the modern
theory of the ﬁrm loses much of its main reason for being. Once human capital (labour) becomes
the most important\sole creator of wealth\value added then modern economic theory is in need
of modiﬁcation. The theory does not, however, lose all relevance. As Hart (1995: 56-7) explains,
at least some, nonhuman assets are essential to a theory of the ﬁrm. To see why this may be
so consider a situation where ‘ﬁrm’ 1 acquires ‘ﬁrm’ 2, which consists entirely of human-capital.
The question Hart raises is, What is to stop ﬁrm 2’s workers from quitting? Without any physical
assets−e.g. buildings−ﬁrms 2’s workers would not even have to relocate themselves physically.
If these workers were linked by telephones or computers, which they themselves own, they could
simply announce one day that they had decided to become a new ﬁrm. For the acquisition of
ﬁrm 2 by ﬁrm 1 to make economic sense there has to be a source of value in ﬁrm 2 over and above
the human-capital of the workers. It makes little sense to buy a ‘ﬁrm’ if that ‘ﬁrm’ can just get
up and walk away. Hart argues there must be some ‘glue’ holding ﬁrm 2’s workers in place.
The value which acts as this glue may consist of as little as a place to meet; the ﬁrm’s name,
reputation, or distribution network; the ﬁrm’s ﬁles, containing important information about its
operations or its customers; or even a contract that prohibits ﬁrm 2’s workers from working for
competitors or from taking existing clients with them should they quit. The source of value may
even just represent the diﬃculty ﬁrm 2’s workers face in co-ordinating a move to another ﬁrm.
But, Hart points out, without something binding the ﬁrm together, the ﬁrm becomes a phantom,
and as such we should expect that such ﬁrms would be ﬂimsy and unstable entities, constantly
subject to the possibility of break-up or dissolution.
Thus even a human-capital based ﬁrm will involve some nonhuman-capital, but the human-
capital will play the dominate role. The important characteristic of human-capital is that it
embodies information and knowledge. A theory of the human-capital based ﬁrm has to model
this co-existence of the human and nonhuman-capital. Brynjolfsson (1994) deals with the issue
by extending the property rights approach to the ﬁrm to include information whether this in-
formation is embodied in humans, in the form of human-capital, or in artifacts. Rabin (1993)
15also works within the property rights framework but extends it by assuming that an agent has
information about how to make production more productive which they are willing to sell. The
problem is if the information is not revealed before the agent is paid, a (potential) buyer may
have little reason to believe the agent is truly well-informed, but if the agent reveals the infor-
mation up front, the buyer could simply use the information without payment. Rabin’s answer
is that the informed agent gains control over productive assets and thus doesn’t have to sell the
information. We look at these two papers below.
If the ﬁrm comprises human capital resources (eg., a legal or accounting ﬁrm) whose accu-
mulated knowledge is the source of wealth, creation the balance of power stemming from the
“ownership of the means of production”, has changed. Likewise predictions about what would
happen at the dissolution of a knowledge-ﬁrm, is also unclear. Who has the rights to the sell-oﬀ
of the assets, where these assets are embodied in human beings? How can these assets be sold-
oﬀ? These issues, although important in the context of the economic theory of the ﬁrm may
have less importance when trying to measure the size\scale of the knowledge economy. However
they are likely to have profound eﬀects on the idea of a Knowledge Society where the balance of
(economic) power will change - owners of physical capital losing this to owners of human capital,
which without slavery map one-to-one to each individual. An individual’s own economic power
would likely vary with their diﬀerent stocks of human capital as would the price they charge to
hire it to others in the form of employment. This in turn aﬀects who wins and who loses from
the knowledge society.
In Brynjolfsson’s model he considers an entrepreneur who has some expertise needed to run
a ﬁrm. No value can be created without both the knowledge asset of the entrepreneur and the
physical assets of the ﬁrm. He assumes that no comprehensive contract can be written between
the entrepreneur and the ﬁrm. If the entrepreneur doesn’t own the ﬁrm, then if he makes an
investment in eﬀort and creates value he can be subject to hold-up by the other party since
he needs the ﬁrm’s physical assets. If the entrepreneur owns the ﬁrm then clearly the hold-up
problem goes away. The most obvious interpretation of Brynjolfsson model is as a model of a
labour-owned ﬁrm. Brynjolfsson argues that it is optimal to give the entrepreneur ownership of
the physical assets of the ﬁrm since he has information that is essential to its productivity. This
result is obviously just an application of Hart and Moore’s proposition 6, that an agent who is
“indispensable” to an asset should own it.11 Here ﬁrms are owned by the indispensable human
11See Hart and Moore (1990: 1133). For Hart and Moore an agent i is indispensable to an asset an if, without
agent i in a coalition, asset an ha no eﬀect on the marginal product of investment for the members of that coalition.
16capital, or more normally by a small section of the human capital eg a partnership. Labour-
owned ﬁrms are one way to form a human capital intensive ﬁrm but the shortcomings of such
organisations are all too obvious: lack of access to capital, inadequate risk pooling, investment
problems − older workers want a shorter pay-back period than younger workers, are membership
rights tradable and if so under what conditions, new members would have to purchase ‘equity’
in the business from retiring ones, borrowing to cover such a purchase could be a problem for
younger would-be members etc.
Rabin starts from the idea that there can be problems for an economic agent who wishes to
sell potentially useful private information to others. Any person who believes that they have some
valuable insights into how to produce something is unlikely to be able to exploit that information
by oﬀering to sell it to an existing ﬁrm. If they do not reveal their information before being
paid, a ﬁrm may have little reason to believe the seller is truly well-informed. If they reveal
the information up front, the ﬁrm may simply use the information without compensating the
would-be seller. When the current owner of the ﬁrm cannot observe how informed the seller is,
Rabin argues that the information seller may have to buy the factory to make money from their
private information. In fact, Rabin shows that the more bargaining power an informed party has,
the more likely they are to obtain control of an asset. In the Rabin model knowledge determines
the owner of the ﬁrm, that is the “indispensable” human capital owns the physical capital just
as in the Brynjolfsson model.
While the Brynjolfsson model is distinct from the Rabin model, they are complementary. The
relationship between information, ownership and authority is central to both papers. Rabin works
within a framework of a adverse selection model and shows that the adverse selection problems
can be such that, in some cases, an informed party has to take over the ﬁrm to show that their
information is indeed useful. The Brynjolfsson model is a moral hazard type framework which
deals with the issue of incentives for an informed party to maximise uncontractible eﬀort.
What may be a problem here is that part of what may be driving the results of both the
Brynjolfsson and Rabin models is the implicit restriction in the GHM framework that the owner
is also the manager. Hart and Holmstr¨ om (2002) note there are several ways to see this: (1)
according to the GHM theory, the major impact of a change in ownership is on those who gain or
lose ownership rights (the owners); however, in a merger between two large ﬁrms it is often the
That is, for all agents j in any coalition S and for all sets A of assets containing an,
vj(S,A) ≡ vj(S,A\{an}) if i  ∈ S.
17case that the key decision makers (the managers) do not have substantial ownership right before
or after the merger. So a model in which the decision makers lose or gain ownership rights must
be a model where the owners are the managers; (2) the relationship-speciﬁc investments analysed
are made by individuals rather than the ﬁrm; and (3) the approach envisions a situation in which
all the relevant parties meet and bargain ex post over the gains from trade and the only issue is
who has the right to walk away with which assets; there are other decisions in the model. As it
stands the model has no room for “organisational structure”, “hierarchy” or “delegation”; in a
sense the model continues to describe a pure market economy, although one enriched by the idea
that individuals can be empowered through the ownership of key nonhuman assets. Holmstr¨ om
(1999: 87) goes so far as to argue that the GHM framework is an owner-manager framework
since the theory is a theory of asset ownership by individuals rather than by ﬁrms. “Assets
are like bargaining chips in an entirely autocratic market.” There are neither ﬁrms nor workers!
Ownership of assets by an individual only provides a theory of organisational identities if we
associate the ﬁrms with those asset owning individuals. The problem is that if human capital is
important to the production process and it makes sense to allocate control of production to the
informed party, that is, make that party the manager, then because the manager must also be
the owner we end up with the human capital owning the ﬁrm. Thus a labour-owned ﬁrm may
be an artifact of the model.
6 Knowledge and production location
As has been discussed Hart (1995: 17) noted that the neoclassical model tells us nothing about
where a ﬁrm’s boundaries will lie or about the size or location of a plant or factory within a given
ﬁrm. This approach is consistent with every existing ﬁrm being a plant or division of one huge
ﬁrm which produces everything. It is also consistent with every plant or division of each existing
ﬁrm being a separate and independent ﬁrm in their own right. Thus it is not clear in what
organisational form production will occur. Will it be organised as a single large factory, several
smaller factories or a household? The GHM approach does delineate the boundaries of the ﬁrm
but still does not tell us anything about the location or size of a plant or factory which is part of
the ﬁrm. Again the form of production organisation is indeterminate. What will be argued below
is that the division of knowledge is one important inﬂuence on the form of organisation in which
production takes place. The most obvious issue has to do with the determination of whether or
not work occurs in a centralised factory or in separate households or some combination. This has
18been an issue since at least the industrial revolution.
In his discussion of the development of the factory system during the industrial revolution
Mokyr (2002: chapter 4) puts forward the argument that the location of production was de-
pendant, in part, on the trade-oﬀ between “the relative costs and beneﬁts of moving people as
opposed to moving information.” Mokyr (2002: 120). That is, he develops a line of reasoning that
suggests that one factor encouraging the organising of workers under a single roof, rather than
in separate households, was the division of knowledge.12 As long as there was little division of
knowledge, so that the knowledge needed to carry out production could be summarised in a few
basic rules, the household could know all that was needed to act as the “unit of production”. The
cost of information moving was low since there was little of it needed and it could be contained
within a household. Moving people between households, however, was slow and costly. But as
technology developed, the competence required for production moved beyond the capability of a
single household.
Mokyr points out that the importance of the division of knowledge to the ﬁrm was ﬁrst recog-
nised, albeit in a non-historical setting, by Demsetz (1988) and formalised by Becker and Murphy
(1992). What these works suggested was a new interpretation of the role of the ﬁrm. Given that
there are limitations to what a worker can know, the competence that a ﬁrm has to possess
to produce must be divided into manageable portions and allocated between the workers. The
actions of the diﬀerent groups of workers are then coordinated by the ﬁrm’s management. Thus
workers who produce on the basis of knowledge they themselves do not possess, have their activi-
ties directed by someone who does possess (at least more) of the necessary knowledge. Therefore
the coordination needed due to asymmetries in information among workers provides a rational
for management. In this way direction is a substitute for education, that is, a substitute for
the transfer of the knowledge itself. Specialisation in knowledge can, therefore, both exacerbate
existing information asymmetries and create new ones. Any information asymmetry gives rise to
an organisation problem for the ﬁrm; how can agents who possess knowledge be encouraged to
reveal their knowledge fully and truthfully to other workers or management. Mokyr argues that
“[p]utting all workers under one roof ensured repeated interaction and personal con-
tact provides maximal bandwidth to maximize the chances that the information will
12Mokyr (2002: 131) outlines the three main explanations for the rise of the factory. “One relies on ﬁxed costs
and technical and physical economies of scale and scope, which might have caused the minimum eﬃcient size of
plants to become larger than the household. A second explanation is drawn from the modem micro-economics of the
ﬁrm: because of asymmetric information and the division of labor, costs were higher in decentralized households,
and the new technology changed the beneﬁts and costs of monitoring and the incentives to self-monitor. A third
argument is that by concentrating all workers under one roof and placing them under supervision, actual labor
eﬀort is enhanced.” To these three Mokyr adds a fourth, the division of knowledge, which we discuss here.
19be transmitted fully and reliably. Inside a plant agents knew and could trust each
other, and this familiarity turned out to be an eﬃcient way of sharing knowledge.”
Mokyr (2002: 141).
From this it can be seen that as long as the minimum competence needed by a ﬁrm is
small, the plant size can also be small and can, therefore, coincide with the household. When
the competence needed grows the unit of production has to change or an eﬃcient network for
knowledge distribution has to develop. At a time when the main technique for the distribution
of knowledge was direct contract, as at the time of the industrial revolution, such networks in
the form of professional associations of mechanics, machinists, engineers etc did develop. But the
ﬁrm was also an answer to the problem of knowledge distribution. Costs of accessing knowledge
were minimised in a single plant where workers could communicate face to face. Factories acted
as repositories of technical knowledge and allowed workers to access this information at relatively
low cost.
As pointed out by Mokyr, the Demsetz\Becker-Murphy framework also suggests that
“...when knowledge can be shared and trusted among people by means other than
personal contact ...ﬁrms may survive, but large plants may become less necessary.”
(Mokyr 2002: 141).
This point is becoming more important as the use of ICTs is expanding.
The development of ICTs has meant that the costs of moving people as opposed to moving
information have risen sharply. The costs involved in sending and receiving information have
fallen thanks to technologies such as email and the Internet along with falls in the costs of long-
distance phone calls and the expanding use of cellular networks. The costs of people moving have
not fallen however. Commuting to work via congested city and suburban streets, for example,
is at least as diﬃcult as it was two decades ago. The increasing interest in congestion pricing in
many cities around the world suggests that traﬃc problems are not lessening. The ever increasing
relative cost of moving people would suggest that the size of the “unit of production” should be
moving away from the large factory, so dominant for the last two centuries, towards more home
based production, as in the period before the industrial revolution. Mokyr does however add a
cautionary note;
“...it seems clear that the movement away from factory settings will eventually run
into diminishing returns and that the locus of work will remain a mixture of work at
home and work away from home”. (Mokyr 2002: 155).
20Brynjolfsson (1994) also sees advantages in ﬁrms being small when information is important
in production. In his view
“...small ﬁrms are likely to have an advantage in providing incentives, not only be-
cause it is likely to be easier to separate out and contractually reward the individual
contributions, but also because agents in smaller ﬁrms have stronger incentives to
make uncontractible contributions as well. ...When it is important to provide incen-
tives for the application of information in ways that cannot be easily foreseen and
incorporated into a contract small ﬁrms have a relative advantage over large ﬁrms.”
(Brynjolfsson 1994: 1654).
Both the Demsetz\Becker-Murphy and Brynjolfsson models indicate that when knowledge
is an important factor of production, small ﬁrms have advantages. If Mokyr is right then this
downsizing of ﬁrms should lead to a movement back towards home production and away from
large factory production.
7 Conclusion
Current research oﬀers an increased understanding of how markets operate in the knowledge
economy and some understanding of the eﬀect of this on corporate strategy and related manage-
ment issues.13 This, however, stops short of an actual theory of the knowledge ﬁrm. While it is,
as Foss (1997: 309) notes,
“...generally recognized that knowledge problems are behind all interesting aspects
of economic organization, and that the major function of, for example, ﬁrms is to
cope with the economic problems introduced by changing, partial, tacit, complex,
asymmetrical, etc., knowledge[,]”
it must also be recognised that none of the orthodoxy theories of the ﬁrm capture the full
implications of knowledge for economic organisation. The previous sections made this point
by brieﬂy outlining the eﬀects of the increasing importance of knowledge for the mainstream
theories of the ﬁrm. It was argued that the neo-classical production function approach is not a
true theory of the ﬁrm but rather the ﬁrm is portrayed as a uninvestigated perfectly eﬃcient ‘black
box’ which simply turns inputs into outputs without organisation structure. Output is produced
13See, for example, Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001), Carley (2000), Kling and Lamb (2000), Leibold,
Probst and Gibbert (2005), Shapiro and Varian (1999), and Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson (2000).
21by the actions of multiply input owners interacting solely via the market. Relationship-speciﬁc
investment induced hold-up arguments for vertical integration are at their weakest when dealing
with human capital. Human capital can not be owned in the same way as physical capital and
so the investor in human capital can act opportunistically whether an employee or not. The
incentive-system theory assumes the use of a physical asset rather than a human capital asset
in the production process. Neither the the ownership nor the value of a human asset can be
transferred and so such an asset cannot determine where the boundaries of the ﬁrm lie within the
model. The extensions of the GHM framework oﬀered by Brynjolfsson (1994) and Rabin (1993)
inherits the implicit owner-manager restriction of the original GHM framework and thus are of
limited value when modelling the knowledge ﬁrm. When we turn to the location of production the
models suggest that we should, in general terms, see a movement back towards home production
but we are not given a speciﬁc relationship between knowledge and plant size or production
location.
We are left with an unsatisfactory model of the (knowledge) ﬁrm and thus we are unable to
give guidance on either empirical or policy questions that ﬂow, via changes to the ﬁrm, from
the development of the knowledge economy. Firm’s organisational structures are changing in
response to the increased prominence of information and knowledge in the production process.
In the new economy, not only will we see changes in the location of production, but even if
production still takes place within a traditional ﬁrm, a factory or an oﬃce, that ﬁrm may have
a very diﬀerent structure and organisation from that which we see today. As was noted in the
Introduction Rajan and Zingales (2003: 87) argue that we are in fact seeing a new “kinder,
gentler ﬁrm”. This is in response to the increase in the importance of human capital, along with
increased competition and access to ﬁnance, all of which have increased the worker’s importance
and improved the outside options for workers, thereby changing the balance of power within
ﬁrms. The Introduction also pointed out that in Rajan and Zingales’s view
“[t]he single biggest challenge for the owners or top management today is to manage
in an atmosphere of diminished authority. Authority has to be gained by persuading
lower managers and workers that the workplace is an attractive one and one that they
would hate to lose. To do this, top management has to ensure that work is enriching,
that responsibilities are handed down, and rich bonds develop among workers and
between themselves and workers” (Rajan and Zingales 2003: 87).
22Cowen and Parker (1997) make a similar point about changing organisational structures. For
them,
“[i]nformation as a factor of production is making old functional structures and meth-
ods of organisation and planning redundant in many areas of business. The successful
use of knowledge involves not only its generation, but also its mobilisation and in-
tegration, requiring a change in the way it is handled and processed.” (Cowen and
Parker 1997: 12).
Organisational change, as far as Cowen and Parker are concerned, is the consequence of the
increasing need to make use of market principles within the ﬁrm and the growing importance of
human capital. They note that as far as a ﬁrm’s labour force is concerned,
“[t]he emphasis now is upon encouraging knowledge acquisition, skills and adaptabil-
ity in the workforce as critical factors in competitive advantage.” (Cowen and Parker
1997: 32).
Firms are obliged to rely more on market based mechanisms as the most eﬃcient way of processing
and transmitting information and giving the ﬁrm the ﬂexibility and yet also focus it requires.
Companies are decentralising their management systems as a way of coping with the uncertainty
and pace of change in their markets. The aim is to ensure that those with the require knowledge
and right incentives are the ones making the decisions and taking responsibility for the outcomes.
Cowen and Parker (1997: 25-8) emphasise how advances in ICTs underlie the ability to be able
to combine the advantages of this organisational ﬂexibility with mass production.14
As people become a increasingly important part of the production process two additional
issues will become more pressing for the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst is that (tacit) knowledge about how to
produce will be more imperfect as it is necessarily distributed among an increasing number of
diﬀerent people. The second problem is that knowledge about how to integrate the know-how of
the diﬀerent workers is also imperfect. As Langlois and Foss (1999: 203) note,
“[t]he ﬁrst possibility brings us to the issue of capabilities; the second to the issue of
qualitative coordination.”
Capabilities are ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge which is often tacit and distributed among members of
the ﬁrm.15 Such know-how is only utilised via the implementation of a multi-worker production
14In addition to Cowen and Parker (1997) see Gable and Ellig (1993) and Koch (2007) for more detail on
market-based management.
15For more on capabilities and organisation see, for example, Loasby (1998a, 1998b) and Richardson (1972).
23process where no one worker has complete knowledge of the process. This means that some kind
of qualitative coordination is required to utilise eﬃciently the aggregate knowledge available.
With the growth in the importance of human capital, ﬁrms increasing face the issue of how to
align not just the cooperating parties incentives but also align their knowledge and expectations.
Capabilities and routines have a greater role to play as coordinating devices within the knowledge
ﬁrm.
But little of these types of changes and issues are captured or explained by the mainstream
theory of the ﬁrm. Expanding the orthodox view of the ﬁrm to include the new reality of the
knowledge economy should be an urgent issue on the economic research agenda. As was argued
in the Introduction, changes to the ﬁrm matter simply because so much economic activity takes
place within their boundaries. As a consequence, changes to the ﬁrm will help determine who the
“winners and losers” from the knowledge economy are. As in all previous “economic revolutions”,
this is the ultimate issue to do with the knowledge economy.
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